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ABSTRACT 
 
Through strengthened third-party obligations for data 
protection, the European Union’s General Data Protection 
Regulation will export privacy norms. However, developing 
economies may want to consider a co-regulatory industry 
approach to data protection before adopting similar national 
legislation. The General Data Protection Regulation can be an 
ideal model for global harmonization of privacy laws, particularly 
for adoption among industries and willing participants. To benefit 
from a co-regulatory approach, however, a developing economy 
would need to invest in education and legal systems in order to 
capture the benefits of the growing e-commerce market that will 
undoubtedly be influenced by the General Data Protection 
Regulation.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In January 2012, the European Union (“EU”) released a 
new proposal for data protection that would replace the 1995 Data 
Protection Directive.
1
 This proposal, also known as the General 
Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”), was adopted in April 2016.2 
                                                                                                             
1
 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, COM (2012) 11 final, 
(Jan. 25, 2012), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/dataprotection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_ 
en.pdf. 
2
 Regulation 2016/679 (EU) of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, hereinafter “GDPR 
Final Text,” available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
2
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The GDPR represents the next wave of data protection reform that 
will strengthen compliance by third-party subcontractors with 
whom data is shared. The GDPR replaces the Data Protection 
Directive 95/46/EC (the “Directive”), which was created to 
harmonize data privacy laws across the EU member states. Given 
the significant technological changes since the Directive was passed 
in 1995, the GDPR seeks to preserve EU harmonization while 
modernizing data privacy laws. The GDPR includes assurances that 
citizens who provide their information with informed consent will 
have their information protected even when that information is 
shared with third parties. While the GDPR still requires EU member 
states to enact harmonizing national legislation, it improves upon 
the 1995 Directive by strengthening protections for individual rights 
and increases the power of the European Commission over those of 
national data protection commissions. By May 2018, all member 
states will have nationalized the requirements of the GDPR.
3
 
Through strengthened third-party obligations for data 
protection, the European Union’s GDPR will result in the 
exportation of privacy norms. However, developing economies 
may want to consider a co-regulatory industry approach to data 
protection before adopting similar national legislation. Part I of this 
Article explains the history and of data privacy law in the 
European Union. Part II discusses how the GDPR can lead to the 
adoption of data privacy practices in countries without 
comprehensive data privacy laws through the private sector. Part 
III identifies challenges for developing economies to adopt a 
comprehensive regime like the GDPR, and proposes co-regulatory 
approach for data privacy.  
 
I.  THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A LEADER IN PRIVACY AND 
SECURITY REGULATION 
 
Soon after the ‘big data’ phenomenon and rise of massive 
                                                                                                             
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2016.119.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ:L:201
6:119:FULL. 
3
 Id.  
3
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global data collectors enabled by the Internet, privacy became a 
major concern among many Western nations. European officials 
were quick to respond to growing concerns regarding big data and 
privacy with sweeping data protection laws adopted in 1995. 
Speculations arose that the EU would become the driver of 
international privacy norms.
4
 For example, in 2001, Joel 
Reidenberg, a law professor at Fordham University, testified 
before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce that “[i]n 
effect, Europe through the European Directive has displaced the 
role that the United States held since the famous Warren and 
Brandeis article in setting the global privacy agenda.”5 Today, the 
European Union has arguably emerged as a leader in the fight to 
preserve traditional norms of individual privacy in the digital age. 
If any nation—or, as in this case, group of nations—can be 
effective at exporting its privacy norms across the globe, it will 
likely be the EU. 
Until the mid-nineties, each of the EU member states had 
unique national privacy legislation.
6
 However, under this model, 
efforts within individual countries to ensure privacy for their 
citizen’s data could easily be undermined when that data was 
transferred to other member states with weaker data protection 
regulations. This prompted the EU to attempt to harmonize data 
protection with omnibus privacy laws.
7
 Unlike the United States, 
                                                                                                             
4
 See, e.g., The EU Data Protection Directive: Implications for the U.S. 
Privacy Debate: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Commerce, Trade, and 
Consumer Protection, 107th Cong., at 
http://www.house.gov/commerce/hearings/03082001-49reidenberg104/htm 
(2001) (testimony of Prof. Joel Reidenberg). 
5
 Id. 
6
 See, e.g., Jeffrey B. Ritter, et al., Emerging Trends in International 
Privacy Law, 15 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 87, 90–91 (2001) (“The genesis of modern 
legislation in this area can be traced to the first data protection law in the world, 
enacted in the Land of Hesse in Germany in 1970. That enactment was followed 
by national laws with differing objectives and scope in Sweden (1973), the 
United States (1974), Germany (1977), and France (1978).”). 
7
  Directive 95/46 1995 O.J. (L 218) 31 (EC), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:en:HTML. 
4
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which regulates data protection from a sector approach,
8
 the EU’s 
omnibus approach was intended to establish standards for 
information law broadly.  
In 1995, the European Parliament adopted the EU Data 
Protection Directive
9
 with two major objectives: (1) to protect the 
fundamental right to data protection; and (2) to guarantee the free 
flow of personal information between member states.
10
 This latter 
goal enabled the European Union to achieve greater harmonization 
of data protection by requiring that each Member State enact 
national legislation to protect “the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of natural persons . . . .”11 The Directive requires any 
EU-based company to comply with specific rules for processing 
and transferring European consumer data and further grants those 
consumers certain rights and controls with regards to their personal 
data, such as the right to be notified of all uses and disclosures 
about data collection and processing, and the right to correct or 
delete personal data.  
The Directive imposes certain privacy requirements on 
those who would collect consumer data. It requires, for example, 
that companies protect personal information with adequate 
security, and companies can only transfer data to other countries 
with an “adequate level of protection.”12 This means that European 
companies seeking to utilize third-party services in another country 
need to ensure that equivalent privacy and security are 
implemented by the third-party company in order to transfer 
personal data outside of Europe.  
Since the adoption of the Data Protection Directive, the EU 
has passed other complementary directives that further address the 
                                                                                                             
8
  Peter P. Swire & Kenesa Ahmad, Foundations of Information Privacy 
and Data Protection: A Survey of Global Concepts, Laws and Practices 32 
(Terry McQuay ed., 2012). 
9
 Directive 95/46 1995 O.J. (L 218) 31 (EC), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:en:HTML. 
10
 Id.  
11
 Id. 
12
 Id. at art. 25. 
5
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collection and use of personal information issues aggravated by 
new technologies. The Directive on Privacy and Electronic 
Communications was established in 2002 to address protections in 
electronic mail, telephone communication, traffic data, caller ID, 
and spam.
13
 This directive was then altered by the Data Retention 
Directive, which set out minimum and maximum retention 
schedules for data.
14
 The 2009 Amendment Directive, also known 
as the Cookie Directive, required that opt-in consent be given for 
the use of cookies on a website.
15
  
 
II. THE NEW GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION WILL 
PUSH EU PRIVACY NORMS TO NON-EU COUNTRIES VIA THE PRIVATE 
SECTOR.  
 
In January 2012, the EU released a new proposal for data 
protection that would replace the 1995 Data Protection Directive.
16
 
The GDPR was adopted in April 2016.
17
 The GDPR represents the 
next wave of data protection reform that will strengthen 
compliance by third-party subcontractors with whom data is 
shared. The GDPR replaces the Data Protection Directive 
95/46/EC (the “Directive”), which was created to harmonize data 
privacy laws across the member states of the European Union. 
Given the significant technological changes since the Directive 
                                                                                                             
13
 Directive 2002/58, 2002 O.J. (L 200) (EC) on Privacy and Electronic 
Communications, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV:l24120.  
14
 Directive 2006/24, 2006 O.J. (L 105) (EC), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32006L0024. 
15
 Directive 2009/136, 2009 O.J. (L 337) (EC), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:337:0011:0036:EN:P
DF. 
16
 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, COM (2012) 11 final, 
(Jan. 25, 2012), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/dataprotection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_ 
en.pdf. 
17
 See GDPR Final Text at art. 44. 
6
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was passed in 1995, the GDPR seeks to preserve EU 
harmonization while modernizing data privacy laws. The GDPR 
includes assurances that citizens who provide their information 
with informed consent will have their information protected even 
when that information is shared with third parties.
18
 While the 
GDPR still requires EU member states to enact harmonizing 
national legislation, it improves upon the 1995 Directive by 
strengthening protections for individual rights and increases the 
power of the European Commission over those of national data 
protection commissions. By May 2018, all member states will have 
nationalized the requirements of the GDPR.
19
 
 
A.   Binding Corporate Rules and Model Clauses 
 
A chief provision of the GDPR is that EU rules must apply 
if personal data is handled abroad by companies that actively offer 
services to EU citizens or render services to entities in the EU.
20
 
Today, data can comply with European data privacy laws by 
requiring contractual commitments from subcontractors to 
maintain a reasonable level of security, employ industry standard 
security practices, and obey all applicable data security laws. This 
approach has been accepted under EU law because current 
regulations permit the transfer of personal data to third-party 
countries that do not have an “adequate level of protection” if the 
protection of privacy and individual freedoms “result from 
appropriate contractual clauses.”21  
Companies subjected to EU data protection laws have taken 
three main approaches: (1) adopting binding corporate rules 
(“BCRs”); (2) signing standard contractual clauses also known as 
Model Clauses; and (3) waiting for the Privacy Shield, which will 
                                                                                                             
18
  Id. (“Consent should cover all processing activities carried out for the 
same purpose or purposes. When the processing has multiple purposes, consent 
should be given for all of them.”). 
19
 Id. at art. 51. 
20
 Id at chapter V. 
21
 Directive 95/46/EC, Art. 26(2). 
7
Curtiss: Privacy Harmonization and the Developing World: The Impact of the
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2016
  
 
 
 
 
 
102 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS   [VOL. 12:1 
replace the Safe Harbor a new self-certification regime for data 
transfers to U.S. processors. For example, in the wake of the U.S.-
EU Safe Harbor invalidation,
22
U.S. a few companies implemented 
BCRs or signed Model Clauses in an effort to continue doing 
business with EU customers and partners.
23
  
Reliance on BCRs and Model Clauses has not been widely 
adopted, even by those seeking an alternative to the Safe Harbor. 
Fewer than a hundred companies globally have sought to have 
their BCRs approved by a national data protection authority.
24 
This 
is partly due to the time, expense, and effort it takes to get 
approval.
25
 Due to the uncertainty regarding safeguards sufficient 
to permit cross-border data transfers—aggravated by the 
invalidation of the Safe Harbor—even data protection authorities 
are taking a wait-and-see approach until there is clear guidance on 
how to comply.
26
 
                                                                                                             
22
 See Press Release, Court of Justice of the European Union, The Court 
of Justice declares that the Commission’s US Safe Harbour Decision is invalid, 
Court of Justice of the European Union (Oct. 6, 2015), available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2015-
10/cp150117en.pdf. 
23
 See, e.g., Ancestry.com, Ancestry EU Safe Harbor - Privacy Shield 
Update, available at http://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/ancestry-eu-safe-harbor-
privacy-shield (last visited Aug. 12, 2016); see also Daniel Alvarez, Safe 
Harbor Is Dead; Long Live the Privacy Shield?, Bus. L. Today, May 2016, at 1, 
4 (“Consequently, companies that have been using Safe Harbor must analyze 
and implement alternative mechanisms going forward, at least until a new 
agreement is reached.”). 
24
 See European Commission, List of companies for which the EU BCR 
cooperation procedure is closed, European Commission – Justice (last accessed 
May 22, 2016), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/international-transfers/binding-corporate-
rules/bcr_cooperation/index_en.htm. 
25
 See Phillip Rees et al., Transferring Personal Data Outside the EEA: 
The Least Worst Solution, 13 Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 
66 (2007). 
26
 See, e.g., Mark Young & Monika Kuschewsky, EU Data Protection 
Authorities Enforcement Guidance Post-Schrems, National Law Review, Feb. 
21, 2016 (“Senior officials within the Swedish Data Protection Authority are 
reported to have put in place an informal enforcement moratorium, the duration 
of which is uncertain as ‘for the moment [the Swedish Data Protection Authority 
8
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Compliance with the GDPR will likely still rely on 
contractual commitments as a main mechanism to enforce EU 
privacy regulations abroad.
27
 As such, European data controllers 
(i.e. the companies collecting consumer information) are 
encouraged to require non-EU processors (e.g. subcontractors) to 
sign data protection commitments that have been approved by an 
EU member state’s data protection authority.28 The GDPR does 
this by officially recognizing the use of BCRs and Model Clauses 
as appropriate safeguards: “[s]uch appropriate safeguards may 
consist of making use of binding corporate rules, standard data 
protection clauses adopted by the Commission, standard data 
protection clauses adopted by a supervisory authority or 
contractual clauses authorized by a supervisory authority.”29 
 
B.   Enhanced Administrative Fines 
 
Apart from its formal recognition of the use of approved 
BCRs and Model Clauses as appropriate safeguards, the GDPR 
differs from 1995 Data Protection Directive in its increase in the 
size of monetary sanctions for violations.
30
 For example, severe 
breaches may be subjected to fines of “up to 4% of worldwide 
turnover.”31 For companies such as Google and Facebook, 
violations of the GDPR could be a large as €460 million ($516 
million) and €2.3 billion ($2.6 billion), respectively.32 In addition, 
                                                                                                             
is] not taking any such action.’”). 
27
 See Manu J. Sebastian, The European Union's General Data Protection 
Regulation: How Will It Affect Non-EU Enterprises?, 31 Syracuse J. Sci. & 
Tech. L. Rep. 216, 242–43 (2015). 
28
 See Virginia Boyd, Financial Privacy in the United States and the 
European Union: A Path to Transatlantic Regulatory Harmonization, 24 
Berkeley J. Int'l L. 939, 993 (2006). 
29
 GDPR Final Text, Clause 108.  
30
 See id. at Art 83. 
31
 James Drury-Smith et al., Two Years to Get Ready – GDPR Adopted, 
JD Supra (Apr. 15, 2016), available at http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/two-
years-to-get-ready-gdpr-adopted-56868/. 
32
 Cyrus Farivar, EU agrees on new law that severely punishes firms for 
9
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each supervisory data authority would have the power to impose 
administrative fines and would not be preempted by a fine imposed 
by another authority. The GDPR outlines multiple factors that 
should aid an authority when determining the appropriate 
administrative fine. In the end, however, that the fine is required 
only to be “effective, proportionate and dissuasive.”33 
For the GDPR to be effective in exporting data protection 
standards, companies will need to believe that data protection 
authorities are actively imposing fines or other sanctions. If 
companies believe that enforcement is rare, or occurs only in cases 
of severe data breaches, companies may feel taking the risk of 
enforcement is not worth the investment into strengthened data 
protection. Respect for the GDPR is critical to effectuate the 
desired level of protection of an individual’s information and 
harmonizing global privacy laws. The downstream privacy and 
security obligations will encourage compliance as a selling point, 
and therefore stimulate investment in data protection.
34
 This could 
create market competition and so motivate other companies to also 
implement privacy practices into their operations. However, if the 
private sector does not believe in the GDPR’s enforcement, or if 
there is a respected dissent against the GDPR that creates 
uncertainty of its shelf-life, the pressure to ensure third-party 
compliance will remain lax and largely on paper. 
With data collectors bearing more risk for the activities of 
their subcontractors, the GDPR may have the effect of exporting 
European privacy norms through the private sectors seeking to do 
                                                                                                             
violating user privacy, ARS Tᴇᴄʜɴɪᴄᴀ UK (Dec. 16, 2015), available at 
http://arstechnica.co.uk/tech-policy/2015/12/tech-firms-could-owe-up-to-4-of-
global-revenue-if-they-violate-new-eu-data-law/. 
33
 GDPR Final Text, Article 83.  
34
  World Economic Forum & Accenture, Digital Transformation of 
Industries: Digital Enterprise, Geneva: World Economic Forum (Jan. 2016, 12), 
available at http:// reports.weforum.org/digital-transformation-of-industries/ wp-
content/blogs.dir/94/mp/files/pages/files/digital-enterprisenarrative-final-
january-2016.pdf (“The growing use of data will create new opportunities for 
businesses in fields such as data analysis, data transparency and cybersecurity. It 
will also require higher levels of investment in data security by those companies 
collecting, storing and analyzing consumer data.”). 
10
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international business. 
  
11
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III. A MODEL FOR DEVELOPING ECONOMIES? 
 
The question underlying the GDPR and its downstream 
impact on data processors is whether its data protection standards 
should serve as a model for non-EU countries, particularly 
developing countries without established or robust privacy 
regimes. To answer this question, we must consider the pros and 
cons of the comprehensive approach taken by the EU embodied in 
the GDPR, as well as the realities common among developing 
countries, such as potential resources for enforcement.  
Four major models for data protection are commonly used 
around the world; comprehensive, sectoral, self-regulatory, and 
technology-based.
35
 Comprehensive data protection laws govern 
the collection, use, and dissemination of personal information in 
both the public and private sectors.
36
 The sectoral framework 
protects personal information by enacting laws that address a 
particular industry sector, such as medical records and credit 
records.
37
 The self-regulatory model emphasizes the creation of 
codes of practice for the protection of personal information by a 
company, industry or independent body.
38
 The technology-based 
model uses technical measures as alternative protections that 
reduce the relative importance of administrative measures for 
overall privacy protections such as encryption.
39
  
The EU has used the comprehensive model since its 1995 
adoption of the Data Protection Directive, and has continued this 
approach in the GDPR. The primary benefit of a comprehensive 
approach is its installation of an official agency or commissioner 
responsible for overseeing enforcement, also known as a data 
                                                                                                             
35
  Swire, supra note 6. 
36
  David Banisar & Simon Davies, Global Trends in Privacy Protection: 
An International Survey of Privacy, Data Protection and Surveillance Land and 
Developments, 18 J. Marshall J Computer & Info L. 1 (Fall 1999). 
37
  See Pub. L. No. 104-191 (1996) (Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act); Pub. L. No. 91-508 (1970) (Fair Credit Reporting Act). 
38
  An example of a self-regulatory model is the Payment Card Industry 
Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) which outlines measures for cardholder data 
security. 
39
  Swire, supra note 6 at 34. 
12
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protection authority.
40
 The data protection authority is also 
generally responsible for educating the public on data protection 
and also acts as an international liaison for data protection 
matters.
41
  
However, the comprehensive approach is not without its 
critics.
42
 The three main criticisms of the one-size-fits all model 
are: (1) the costs of the regulations can outweigh the benefits, (2) 
the same level of strictness may not be justified for all types of 
data, and relatedly, (3) a comprehensive regime may stifle 
innovation.
43
  
 
A.   Challenges with a comprehensive approach to privacy 
 
For developing countries, the costs alone may undermine 
the integrity of adopting the regulations under the GDPR.
44
 These 
costs will come in the form of cyber liability insurance and the 
tools and effort to comply with “consent, data mapping and cross-
border transfer requirements.”45 Even if a country were to adopt 
comprehensive data protection laws, they might lack the resources 
to implement and enforce those laws. Resources would be needed 
to fund the enforcing body as well as its costly paperwork, 
documentation, auditing, and other requirements. Cost burdens 
would affect not only the government but any and all companies 
subject to the regulations. At a minimum, companies would be 
required to have a designated representative to respond to privacy 
                                                                                                             
40
  Id. at 31. 
41
   Id.  
42
  See The European Privacy Officers Forum, Comments on Review of 
the EU Data Protection Directive (Directive 95/46/EC) (Jul. 31, 2002) available 
at http://www.epof.org/files/Uploads/Documents/EPOF/EPOF_en2_7.31.02.pdf. 
43
   Id. 
44
  See Data Privacy Survey: GDPR Costs and Complexity a Concern, 
Barker Makenzie (May 4, 2016), available at 
http://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/newsroom/2016/05/data-privacy-survey-
gdpr-costs-and-complexity. 
45
  Id.  
13
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requests and conduct self-assessments.
46
 As mentioned above, 
regulations can only be effective if those regulated believe there is 
meaningful enforcement. Therefore, developing countries with 
budgetary restraints may not have the fiscal means to meet their 
desired privacy ends.  
Another key consideration for developing economies is the 
barrier to innovation that privacy regulations may present to 
burgeoning industries. Similar to the tensions with the use of 
controversial energy sources,
47
 the use of big data spurs tensions 
between developed and developing economies.
48
 For example, 
companies such as Google and Facebook, established in the United 
States, have undoubtedly flourished from their use of user data. 
Anyone seeking to develop a product that utilizes predictive 
algorithms
49
 that are necessarily based on the processing of 
personal data would be hard-pressed to succeed under a 
comprehensive privacy regime; particularly against competitors 
operating in jurisdictions without broad regulations on data use. 
 
B.   Weaknesses for developing economies 
 
Apart from the challenges imposed by a comprehensive 
approach to privacy, developing nations may also be ill-equipped 
to meet GDPR expectations. Developing nations are more likely to 
lack technical sophistication, national privacy regimes, or effective 
judicial systems. These shortcomings would represent significant 
weaknesses for protecting personal information in the data-sharing 
chain.
50
 
                                                                                                             
46
 GDPR Final Text, Art. 27. 
47
 See E.A. Wrigley, Eɴᴇʀɢʏ ᴀɴᴅ ᴛʜᴇ Eɴɢʟɪsʜ Iɴᴅᴜsᴛʀɪᴀʟ Rᴇᴠᴏʟᴜᴛɪᴏɴ 
(2010). 
48
 Rosemary Wyber et al., Big data in global health: improving health in 
low- and middle-income countries, World Health Organization (Jan. 30, 2015), 
available at http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/93/3/14-139022/en. 
49
 Predictive algorithms enable more tailored servicing often associated 
with efficiency and product quality. See generally Pedro Domingos, The Master 
Algorithm (2015).  
50
     Swire, supra note 6. 
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Many developing economies have capitalized on low labor 
costs in providing competitive business process outsourcing for 
companies. Developing and emerging nations striving to be 
premier business process outsourcers are eager to meet the demand 
from the growing tech sector. Many companies have taken 
advantage of differences in labor costs and have chosen to 
outsource business processes such as customer service functions to 
developing nations. These processes often require at least minimal 
access to customer information.
51
 
  
1. Technical Inferiority 
 
Technical inferiority is a major hurdle for data processing 
companies in developing countries.
52
 Often this stems from either a 
lack of local technical education opportunities or from a migration 
of skilled labor—known as a “brain drain”—of a country's 
educated youths.
53
 Even developed nations like the United States 
suffer from a shortage of privacy professionals, and 
training/certification organizations have been growing in an effort 
to meet this need.
54
 For example, the International Association of 
Privacy Professionals was established in 2000 and now boasts over 
3,100 individuals holding the Certified Information Privacy 
Professional for the United States (CIPP/US) credential.
55
 
However, even this amount falls behind in comparison to the 
more-than-4,000 organizations that have workers who are self-
certified under the EU-US Safe Harbor agreement for trans-
                                                                                                             
51
     See Timothy Morey et al., Customer Data: Designing for Transparency 
and Trust, Harvard Business Review, May 2015, available at 
https://hbr.org/2015/05/customer-data-designing-for-transparency-and-trust. 
52
      Swire, supra note 6.  
53
      See, Sunita Dodani & Ronald E LaPorte, Brain drain from developing 
countries: how can brain drain be converted into wisdom gain?, J. R. Soc. Med. 
98, Nov. 2005, 487–491. 
54
 See About the IAPP: The world’s largest global information privacy 
community, International Association of Privacy Professionals ([DATE LAST 
UPDATED/VISITED HERE], available at https://iapp.org/about/. 
55
     Id. 
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continental data transfers. Under a comprehensive model, 
encompassing every organization that collects personal 
information including employee data, it would be difficult for the 
United States to meet the privacy professional need, let alone a 
developing nation without equivalent educating bodies.  
Similarly, privacy in today’s digital world essentially 
requires technical knowledge of industry standard security 
practices.
56
 Despite administrative measures such as privacy 
policies for organizational guidance, technical measures are a key 
ingredient to sufficient data protection. For some developing 
countries, this can be a challenge.
57
 When a population lacks 
reliable access to safe housing, clean water, and health services, 
education and investment in cybersecurity training are lesser 
priorities. For example, many college students in Kenya only have 
access to computers or internet via their universities; those students 
who attend universities without those resources must often resort 
to internet cafes where usage is charged by the minute.
58
  
However, it is important to acknowledge the spectrum of 
developing economies and their varying abilities to have a 
technically educated workforce. Romania, for example, is known 
for producing strong computer science students and is also 
considered a developing economy by the International Monetary 
Fund.
59
 However, a challenge for Romania is keeping their talent 
within its borders, even as a Member State of the EU. Brain drain 
is a major issue for countries like Romania that invest in education, 
but lack the private-sector strength to employ recent graduates.
60
  
                                                                                                             
56
     For example, ISO 27001 and NIST SP 800-53 are two internationally 
recognized information security standards which organizations can audit and 
certify practices against. 
57
   See ISO and IEC Developing Country Assistance Efforts, ANSI, August 
2005.  
58
 This is noted from the author’s personal experience in 2007 in Nairobi, 
Kenya among students at the University of Nairobi and Kenyatta University. 
59
 International Monetary Fund, Uneven Growth: Short- and Long- Term 
Factors, Wᴏʀʟᴅ Eᴄᴏɴᴏᴍɪᴄ Oᴜᴛʟᴏᴏᴋ (Apr. 2015), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/01/pdf/text.pdf 
60
 Marian Chiriac, Romania Fears Brain Drain as Students Head Abroad, 
Bᴀʟᴋᴀɴ Iɴsɪɢʜᴛ, Sept 15, 2015, available at 
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However, the demand for stronger data protection could 
arguably provide an opportunity for countries that are developed 
enough in the education sector to mitigate some losses associated 
with brain drain. According to one Romanian technology 
journalist, several companies “plan to increase their Romanian 
teams by up to 20 percent this year . . . . because security officers 
are easier to find there, compared with Western Europe . . . . [and] 
skills are competitively priced.”61  
Similarly, companies may even prefer to be under the 
authority of developing countries that have security expertise but 
lack a strong technology industry because they may be more 
business-friendly. Like countries that promote themselves as tax 
havens, countries which curate political pressure to attract and 
keep private sector business may offer more lenient enforcement of 
the data protection regulations.
62
 Technical education remains 
important because data protection authorities will still need to be 
able to understand how a company’s technology works to avoid 
arbitrary determinations.  
However, an obvious risk with choosing a developing 
country as an enforcing authority may be a lack of political 
stability and an abundance of corruption. As such, inferiority in 
technical education can make the GDPR an unsavory option for 
developing countries because companies would not be able to find 
the necessary talent to comply with the GDPR. As a result, such 
companies may opt to avoid such local markets. Nevertheless, the 
GDPR may offer an opportunity to position a developing country 
as a desirable location to anchor a regional business hub, despite 
technical inferiority. Companies could prioritize competent 
                                                                                                             
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/many-romanian-students-want-to-
study-abroad-09-24-2015 
61
 Andrada Fiscutean, Demand for security skills is ballooning: So can 
former hacker hotbed Romania help?, Zᴅɴᴇᴛ Mar. 8, 2016, available at 
http://www.zdnet.com/article/demand-for-security-skills-is-ballooning-so-can-
former-hacker-hotbed-romania-help. 
62
 See, e.g., Witold J. Henisz & Bennet A. Zelner, The Hidden Risks in 
Emerging Markets, Harv. Bus. Rev. (Apr. 2010).   
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employees and regulators thirsty for foreign investment. By 
adopting the GDPR, a developing country could become an 
approved nation for international data transfers. 
 
2. Unsophisticated Judicial Regimes 
 
A comprehensive data protection model would designate an 
agency or commissioner as the enforcement mechanism. As 
previously discussed, developing economies have some desirable 
attributes to companies—typically cost-competitive labor and 
accommodating government incentives. However, developing 
economies are often also characterized by underdeveloped legal 
regimes. While this will not necessarily be a barrier to adopting the 
GDPR as a model for national data protection laws, it is likely to 
significantly impact the benefits that would flow from it.  
Under the GDPR, data subjects would need meaningful access 
to a remedy for privacy violations. However, the judicial processes 
of a country seeking to comply with the GDPR for purposes of 
data transfers from other EU countries could undermine the private 
sector’s efforts. Judicial redress for data subjects, for example, was 
a primary reason behind the invalidation of the US-EU Safe 
Harbor agreement.
63
 The EU Commission found that there was 
insufficient access to the courts under U.S. law.
64
 Since the 
invalidation, the United States Congress has sought to remedy this 
gap through legislation.
65
 In doing so, however, Congress has yet 
to mitigate another large concern: government surveillance.  
Developing countries without a sophisticated legal regime 
are likely to find it difficult to meet the judicial requirements. 
Private sector companies in developed countries that have not been 
                                                                                                             
63
  See Natasha Lomas, Europe’s Top Court Strikes Down ‘Safe Harbor’ 
Data-Transfer Agreement With U.S., TechCrunch (Oct. 6, 2015), available at 
https://techcrunch.com/2015/10/06/europes-top-court-strikes-down-safe-harbor-
data-transfer-agreement-with-u-s. 
64
  Id. 
65
 See Client Alerts, US House Passes Judicial Redress Act to Facilitate 
Safe Harbor Negotiations, Cooley LLP (Oct. 23, 2015), available at 
https://www.cooley.com/us-judicial-redress-act-to-facilitate-safe-harbor-
negotiations. 
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approved for data transfers, or countries seeking to perform data 
processing services for international companies, will need to rely 
on the use of binding corporate rules or model clauses.
66
  
The private sector’s reliance on contract law raises another 
issue regarding unsophisticated judicial regimes. Without a 
sophisticated judicial structure, contract breach claims could suffer 
from extreme delays and complicated administrative 
bureaucracies.
67
 Notorious for extreme delays among developing 
economies is India. Economist Matthieu Chemin of McGill 
University investigated the impact of India’s speed in closing cases 
and its impact on the Indian economy.
68
 Under his calculations, 
“[i]n India, it takes an average of 2 years to dispose of any case. . . 
. Extreme examples of judicial slowness refer to cases taking 47 
years to be resolved by which time the plaintiff had died.”69 
Chemin’s results indicated that “the speed of courts across Indian 
states plays an important role in shaping economic activity in this 
important sector of the economy.”70 Important to note, however, is 
the impact that an amendment
71
 to India’s Code of Civil Procedure 
had on improving efficiency and decreasing contract breaches in 
the country. These changes improved the efficiency of the court by 
decreasing the number of cases pending per judge and the average 
                                                                                                             
66
  GDPR Final Text, Clause 108.  
67
  See, e.g., Witold J. Henisz & Bennet A. Zelner, The Hidden Risks in 
Emerging Markets, Harv. Bus. Rev. (Apr. 2010); see also Matthieu Chemin, 
Does Court Speed Shape Economic Activity? Evidence from a Court Reform in 
India, Nov. 11, 2010, J. Law Econ. Organ., available at http://matthieuchemin-
research.mcgill.ca/research/1%20Chemin%202012%20JLEO.pdf 
68
 Matthieu Chemin, Does Court Speed Shape Economic Activity? 
Evidence from a Court Reform in India, J. Law Econ. Organ., Nov. 11, 2010, 
available at http://matthieuchemin-
research.mcgill.ca/research/1%20Chemin%202012%20JLEO.pdf. 
69
 Id. at 6 (citing Krishnamoorty, Dasu, Judicial Delays, Indolink, 
editorial analysis, 2003). 
70
  Id. at 24. 
71
  The Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002 Act NO. 22 of 
2002, (May 23, 2002). 
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case duration.
72
 Chemin’s research found that speedier courts 
“decrease[] the probability to experience a breach of contract, 
increases investment, and decrease[] the probability to experience 
a shortage of capital.”73 
Developing countries that fail to recognize the importance 
of judicial efficiency will, in effect, only harm the data processing 
companies that exist within their borders and strive to be compliant 
with the GDPR through contractual means. Further, by having a 
legal system that does not provide avenues for redress for foreign 
citizens, efforts to harmonize with the EU’s GDPR will remain 
incomplete. Thus, developing countries would be unable to benefit 
from its adoption. 
 
3. Eagerness to grow 
 
However, a developing country’s eagerness to grow could 
harm its efforts to harmonize with the GDPR if that eagerness 
outweighs its efforts to implement data protection measures.
74
 This 
could take place at either the governmental or private sector levels. 
If a government becomes too eager to tout itself as progressive on 
privacy in an effort to look modernized, or to attract business 
without following through, for example, then it is unlikely to be 
deemed compliant as an EU data protection /authority.
75
 This 
would create the same results as having an unsophisticated 
judiciary.
76
 Further, eagerness from the private sector to commit to 
security promises and practices without substantial compliance 
could put not only the company, but the country at reputational 
                                                                                                             
72
  Chemin, supra note 67 at 24. 
73
 Id. 
74
  Swire, supra note 6. 
75
  See GDPR Final Text, Clause 103.  
76
  See, e.g., Witold J. Henisz and Bennet A. Zelner, The Hidden Risks in 
Emerging Markets, Harvard Business Review, April 2010. See also Matthieu 
Chemin, Does Court Speed Shape Economic Activity? Evidence from a Court 
Reform in India, J. Law Econ. Organ., Nov. 11, 2010, available at 
http://matthieuchemin-
research.mcgill.ca/research/1%20Chemin%202012%20JLEO.pdf. 
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risk. 
77
 
In a free market, businesses will typically seek to provide 
services that are better, faster, or cheaper. This in turn benefits the 
consumer. However, when it comes to data protection, it is not as 
easy to recognize when data protection commitments are being 
kept. The majority of consumers only learn that a trusted 
organization has not kept up their end of the bargain when a data 
breach occurs, spilling personal information onto the internet.
78
 
More often than not, consumers in developing countries are wholly 
unaware of the nature of their actual data processors, who are often 
third parties outsourced to a more reputable company. Vague and 
overly broad privacy notices generally extend to allow the sharing 
of personal data to third parties when necessary to provide 
services,
79
 and cost considerations may motivate outsourcing 
business processes, such as customer service, to countries with 
lower labor costs.  
In such a race to the bottom on margins, data processors in 
low-cost labor markets would not be incentivized to go above the 
bare minimum necessary to do business. Data security is not cheap. 
It requires the employment of at least one skilled technician, and 
under the GDPR, compliance can be costly.
80
 As seen in the U.S.-
EU Safe Harbor program, the ability to self-certify compliance was 
previously an acceptable means of compliance.
81
 Under the Safe 
                                                                                                             
77
 See Matthieu Chemin, Does Court Speed Shape Economic Activity? 
Evidence from a Court Reform in India, J. Law Econ. Organ., Nov. 11, 2010, 4, 
available at http://matthieuchemin-
research.mcgill.ca/research/1%20Chemin%202012%20JLEO.pdf. 
78
  See Dana Tamir, How a Third-Party Data Breach Leads Hackers to 
Your Data, Security Intelligence, (Feb. 5, 2014), available at 
https://securityintelligence.com/how-a-third-party-data-breach-leads-hackers-to-
your-data. 
79
  See, e.g., Microsoft’s Privacy Statement, Reasons We Share Personal 
Data, available at https://privacy.microsoft.com/en-us/privacystatement (“We 
share your personal data with your consent or as necessary to complete any 
transaction or provide any product you have requested or authorized.”). 
80
 See supra Part III.A.  
81
  See Information Required for Safe Harbor Self-Certification, 
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Harbor, companies based in the United States needed only to self-
certify that they implemented the necessary technical and 
administrative safeguards to adequately protect the privacy 
principles of the EU Data Protection Directive.
82
  Indeed, the only 
requirement was a self-certified statement that the subcontractors 
had sufficient security measures in place. It was not required to 
seek more from subcontracted data processors. A comprehensive 
data security assessment with an audit in the United States can cost 
$48,000 on average for the data collector themselves.
83
 As a result, 
trying to extend this level of independent review was often costly 
for companies, developing country or not. The further down the 
data-sharing chain a data processor lies, the less likely that the 
accountability of a data protection regime will come in to verify 
security commitments; particularly when the data processor is in a 
different country than the original data controller subjected to the 
data protection regulations.
84
  
This diminishing verification and accountability structure 
can create a similar result as having lax enforcement 
mechanisms.
85
 Weighing the cost against the risk, data processors 
may take the gamble. While such behavior is in no way unique to 
developing economies, reputational harm would probably be more 
dramatic for countries trying to gain a market share in business 
process outsourcing. While consumers may not care where the leak 
came from, data controllers who hire the data processors will lose 
trust in the industry. Consumers’ perceptions of an industry’s 
quality will matter in the local economy because they have the 
                                                                                                             
Department of Commerce, available at 
http://2016.export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018491.asp. 
82
 Id. 
83
  See John Verry, ISO-27001 Cost Estimate: $48,000 Information 
Security Confidence: Priceless, PivotPoint Security (July 26, 2012), available at 
http://www.pivotpointsecurity.com/blog/iso-27001-cost-estimate-48000-
information-security-confidence-priceless. 
84
  See Natalie Kim, Three’s A Crowd: Towards Contextual Integrity in 
Third-Party Data Sharing, 28 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 325, 340 (2014) (“The 
additional step down the chain, to the second node, erodes accountability and 
enforceability, delaying regulatory progress in this area.”). 
85
  Id. 
22
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol12/iss1/5
2016]  PRIVACY HARMONIZATION AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD117 
purchasing power. Just as China battles against issues regarding 
the reputation of its product quality,
86
 developing countries in the 
data processing industry may similarly develop reputations for 
being secure only on paper. This, in turn, is likely to hurt the 
companies who are legitimately implementing compliant data 
protection programs.  
As companies seek to reduce costs, the data protections 
may decrease in quality if investments in data security are reduced. 
As discussed in Part II.B., enforcement will be key to compliance. 
The GDPR can be a powerful catalyst to enabling foreign 
investment if companies in developing countries offer low-cost, 
compliant services. Given its reliance on self-certification and the 
large cost to verify compliance, however, the quality assurances 
could be merely representations without actual implementation of 
security measures. On the other hand, if a national government 
were to adopt and enforce national laws in line with the GDPR, 
their enforcement could enable competition among secure 
solutions. 
 
4. Risk of exploitation 
 
Developing economies seeking to gain positions as trusted 
data processors may also risk exploitation by more sophisticated 
organizations. Companies more experienced in contract law—
either by virtue of being located in more legally sophisticated 
jurisdictions or that have superior bargaining power—can take 
advantage companies in developing countries, particularly with 
pass-through terms that would effectively lay liability for data loss 
or leaks on the data processor.
87
 While this would only be the case 
if the data processor were actually to blame, previous discussion 
has noted the diminishing incentive to ensure compliance. As such, 
                                                                                                             
86
  See, e.g., Poorly Made: Why so many Chinese products are born to be 
bad, The Economist (May 14, 2009), available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/13642306. 
87
  See John Ahlquist & Aseem Prakash, FDI and the Costs of Contract 
Enforcement in Developing Countries, Policy Sciences 43, no. 2 (2010) 181-
200. 
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this could result in half-hearted efforts to put pressure on actual 
compliance beyond contractual protections.  
The GDPR seeks to close this exploitation of pass-through 
data protection commitments by holding the data controller liable 
for the breaches of their data processors in cases where the 
enforcing data protection authority determines that the controller 
failed to adequately ensure compliance beyond mere contractual 
commitments.
88
  
This change in data protection law will undoubtedly 
increase accountability among data controllers and data processors 
in turn. Although a data controller may seek to recover costs 
associated with a breach from subcontractors, controllers will be 
incentivized to ensure compliance with contractual commitments 
from the outset, or to contract with subcontractors in countries with 
reliable judicial regimes where they are more likely to successfully 
recover.  
 
C.   A Co-Regulatory Approach 
 
Given the costs and broad protections of the GDPR, the 
best approach for a developing country is likely to be a co-
regulatory model. A co-regulatory model emphasizes industry 
development of enforceable standards for privacy and data 
protection against a backdrop of legal requirements by the 
government.
89
 This approach would be similar to the self-
regulatory approach, in that the regulations would be driven by the 
industry most affected by international data protection laws. 
However, the co-regulatory model would add assurance to data 
controllers by having the government acknowledge a breach of 
those standards as a contract breach.
90
 This could show a 
developing country's commitment to an industry without having to 
stifle innovation in other areas.  
A co-regulatory approach would also be more efficient to 
implement, since standards would be set by those with expertise in 
                                                                                                             
88
  GDPR Final Text, Article 28(4). 
89
  Swire, supra note 6. 
90
  Id. 
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the regulated area instead of relying on government bodies that 
may lack technical skills and knowledge of the area. This 
particularly parallels aspects from the sectoral approach used in the 
United States by picking and choosing important industries,
91
 but 
unlike the United States, would not be significantly retarded by 
government inaction to stay up to date with technological 
advances.
92
  
The GDPR could be an ideal model for global 
harmonization of privacy laws, particularly for adoption among 
industries and willing participants. However, to benefit from a co-
regulatory approach, a developing economy would need to invest 
in education and legal systems in order to capture the benefits of 
the growing e-commerce market.
93
  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The European Union’s new GDPR will inevitably export 
privacy norms beyond the borders of the EU. In the absence of 
government regulation, the private sector will become the leading 
source of privacy norms in industries that collect personal data, 
setting a baseline for competition as well as consumer 
expectations. Given the ease with which personal data can now be 
shared across country borders and the benefits that can arise from 
aggregated data, having consistent protections for personal data 
throughout the data processing lifecycle will allow for more e-
commerce opportunities and increased consumer protection.  
Developing countries with the ability to educate their 
youths have the opportunity to benefit from increasing data 
security needs globally, and these benefits can be increased if the 
country has a trustworthy, pro-business government and an 
efficient judiciary. However, if a government continues to struggle 
with education, corruption, or inefficient courts, then adopting a 
comprehensive privacy or data security regime could hurt even the 
                                                                                                             
91
  See supra note 37. 
92
  Swire, supra note 6. 
93
  See Part II.B(1). 
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well-meaning private sector organizations striving to participate in 
international e-commerce. A co-regulatory approach would be an 
intermediate step towards a comprehensive model that allows a 
nation to roll out a regime with less risk. 
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PRACTICE POINTERS 
 
 Developing countries seeking to ensure an adequate level 
of protection essentially equivalent to that of the EU should 
evaluate whether they have the capacity to independently 
supervise data protection and provide effective and 
enforceable rights through effective administration and 
judicial redress. 
 Data processing companies in non-EU countries should 
consider adopting binding corporate rules or standard 
contractual clauses.  
 EU data controllers should perform due diligence of 
privacy and data security measures for all data processors 
beyond contractual commitments to follow GDPR 
requirements.  
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